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a b s t r a c t
This article proposes an open-source testbed to simulate interaction models governing the exchange of
flexibility services located within a distribution network. The testbed is an agent-based system in which
the distribution system operator, the transmission system operator, producers and retailers make their
decisions based onmixed-integer linear programs. This testbed helps to highlight the characteristics of an
interaction model, the benefits for the agents and eases the detection of unwanted or abusive behaviors
which decreases the welfare. The testbed is implemented in Python and the optimization problems are
encoded in the modeling language ZIMPL. A web interface is coupled with an instance generator using
macroscopic parameters of the system such as the total power production. This testbed is, therefore, well
suited to test the implemented interactionmodels on various scenarios and to extend the implementation
to othermodels. Five interactionmodels developedwith industrial partners are simulated over a year on a
75-bus test system. Simulations show that interaction models relying on active network management, as
they have been developed, lead to substantial welfare even though they suffer from a lack of coordination
between the DSO and the TSO. A conservative interaction model restricting grid users to an access range
that is computed ahead of time to prevent any congestion, avoids shedding distributed generation but
considerably restrains the amount of distributed production.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In previous decades, the operation of the distribution network
did not rely on the flexibility of production or consumption. With
the ongoing trend toward renewable energy, the need for invest-
ments to increase the distribution network capacity could become
too expensive to realize. Distribution SystemOperators (DSO) need
to have access to flexibility services in order to reduce their invest-
ment needs. The literature containsmany papers showing the ben-
efits of using such flexibility in distribution networks [1–4] and the
methods to deliver this flexibility [5–8]. However, few studies have
been performed on the way that the flexibility in distribution net-
work can be exchanged as a commodity in an unbundled electric
system. Since the DSO does not own the assets which are able to
provide flexibility, it has to procure flexibility by contractingwith a
Flexibility Services Provider (FSP) whichmay be producer, retailer,
aggregator, etc. One current challenge faced by regulators is to
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2352-4677/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.design the legislative framework or interactionmodel in which ac-
tors exchange flexibility services located within a distribution net-
work.
This paper proposes an open-source testbed to simulate candi-
date interactionmodels and to perform this kind of comparison. In
this testbed, the distribution network ismodeled up to its interface
to thehigh voltagenetwork anddown tomediumvoltage-lowvolt-
age transformers, i.e. lowvoltage sub-networks are aggregated.We
work in a short term context, from a few days ahead until set-
tlement. We, therefore, do not consider structural changes of the
system. The simulation is performed by an agent-based method
considering as agents the distribution system operator, transmis-
sion system operator, producers and retailers with the consumers
they serve. Every agent solves an optimization problem at every
decision stage in order to maximize its individual objective. The
system operators desire to ensure the safety of their system at
the minimum costs while producers and retailers maximize their
profit by selling or retailing electricity and providing flexibility
services. The major contribution of this paper is the complete
formalization and simulation of the interactions between the
stakeholders of a distribution system exchanging flexibility. These
exchanges are described by five interaction models devised with
industrial partners and their impact is evaluated through a
S. Mathieu et al. / Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 5 (2016) 78–93 79Fig. 1. ZIMPL code of one optimization problem solved by a retailer.measure of the social welfare, the repartition of the welfare be-
tween the actors, and ameasure of the service level that is reached.
The behavior of each agent under a specific interaction model can
be observed andweaknesses or abuses of an interactionmodel can
be highlighted.
The complex interactions that happen in electricitymarkets de-
mand a flexible computational environment where designs can be
tested and sensitivities to power system and market rule changes
can be explored [9]. Agent-based modeling has been extensively
used in the literature to model electric systems [10–13]. The OPTI-
MATE open platform is an example of an agent-based tool used in
power systems. It can be used for evaluating and comparing vari-
ous existing and potential new market designs in several regional
European power markets [14]. Another example uses an agent
based approach for evaluating the effects of the integration of flex-
ible loads in the secondary reserve market [15]. Alternative tech-
niques carrying quantitative analysis in power systems are based
on the computation of market equilibria. For instance, the PRIMES
model computes a market equilibrium solution in the European
Unionmember states taking into considerationmarket economics,
industry structure, energy/environmental policies and regulation
[16]. Note that the references above are related to the wholesale
energy market, whereas the present paper applies agent-based
modeling to interaction models within distribution systems.
Several European projects study the interactions models to
integrate flexibility services in the present electric system. The
ADDRESS project aims at developing a comprehensive commercial
and technical framework for the development of active demand in
the smart grids of the future [17]. This project focuses on questions
such as which information should be available for each actor or
which reference consumption to choose. Other projects in Europe
rely on the deployment of demand side management such as
GREDOR [18], iPower [19], EvolvDSO [20], LINEAR [21], ADINE [22],
Local Load Management [23], Nice Grid [24] and Optimate [25].
The testbed introduced in this paper is a convenient tool to test
the ideas proposed in the previous projects.
The name of the testbed, DSIMA, stands for Distribution Sys-
tem Interaction Model Analysis. This testbed is a framework that
is composed of an instance generator, a simulator and a web-
based user interface. These three modules allow various compro-
mises between versatility and ease of modification. For instance,
the behavior of an agent can easily be changed by changing its
optimization problems written in the user-friendly modeling lan-
guage ZIMPL, see Fig. 1 for an example. More flexibility can be ob-
tained bymodifying the open-source Python 3 code available at the
address http://www.montefiore.ulg.ac.be/~dsima/. In this testbed,
the network is modeled as a network flow model. This model onlyconsiders active power flows and therefore cannot grasp voltage is-
sues. The extension to an optimal power flowmodel over multiple
time periods leads to non-linear and non-convex problems. These
problems are computationally challenging, see [26] for a review of
the current techniques to solve this kind of dynamic optimal power
flows. Integrating OPF would make the testbed more complex to
use, increase the computational power needed to perform the sim-
ulations, and further increase the quantity of input data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the system
studied and the roles that each agent can take. Five possibilities
of interaction models are described in Section 3. The agents of the
system are described in Section 4. This section refers extensively
to Appendix containing the optimization problems characterizing
the behavior of the agents. Section 5 describes the implementation
of the testbed as a simulator, an instance generator and a user
interface. Section 6 discusses the simulation results, and Section 7
concludes.
2. General view of the system
Our analysis is focused on the short term operation of the
medium-voltage (MV) network. In this time frame, active network
management (ANM) consists in the coordination for the usage of
flexibility to operate the distribution system [27]. In the scope of
this paper, we consider the short-term flexibility exchanges in an
operational planning phase. These exchanges are governed by the
interaction model that the agents must follow.
In the sequel of this document, we make the distinction
between the roles and the actors. The roles considered in this paper
are balance responsible parties (BRP), flexibility services providers
(FSP) and flexibility services users (FSU). The actors simulated in
this paper are the DSO, the TSO, producers and retailers, and may
fulfill more than one role, depending on the interaction model. To
operate its network, the DSO may act as a FSU. The TSO is, from
the point of view of this simulation, a FSU with given needs of
flexibility services. Producers and retailers both act simultaneously
as BRPs, FSPs and FSUs.
All of the interaction models we consider follow the procedure
below.
1. DSO analysis and TSO imbalance settlement are based on
reference baselines for every bus. On the day ahead, after
the clearing of day-ahead energy market, BRPs submit their
baselines to the DSO and the TSO.
2. The DSO assesses the state of the system and announces its
flexibility needs to the FSPs. Other FSUs also announce their
needs to the FSPs.
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3. FSPs provide flexibility offers sequentially to each potential FSU,
the first FSU being the DSO.
4. FSUs contract some proposed flexibility offers for their needs.
5. Closer to real-time, FSUs request the activation of their
flexibility services.
6. Right before real-time, each FSP optimizes its realization taking
into account the request of its FSUs, the penalty if a flexibility
service is not provided and its imbalance with respect to the
BRPs of the loads it controls.
7. The distribution network is operated using these realizations
taking last resort actions if necessary, such as shedding buses. If
such actions are needed and FSPs did not provide their service
to the DSO, the FSPs are penalized at a regulated price.
We assume that there is an access contract between a BRP a
and the DSO for each bus n that the BRP has access to. A contract
specifies a full access range [la,n, La,n] and a wider flexible access
range [ka,n, Ka,n], cf. Fig. 2. The BRP can produce or consume with-
out any restrictionwithin the full access range [la,n, La,n], but in the
flexibility intervals [ka,n, la,n] and [La,n, Ka,n] theDSO canorder a re-
striction of the production or consumption, if necessary. In general,
stakeholders are free to exchange flexibility services among them,
but if the profile of a BRP is within the flexibility intervals, it has to
propose flexibility offers to the DSO via FSPs.
The following subsections detail the information exchanged
and action taken by an actor with a given role. The index a is
used for an agent, n for a bus and t for a period. The set of buses
considered by an agent a is denotedNa and is a subset of the total
set of busesN .
2.1. Balance responsible party
Each BRP is responsible for its local and global baseline and
performs the following actions:
1. Submits its global baseline to the TSO.
2. Submits its local baselines to the DSO.
3. Notifies FSPs of the obligation to provide flexibility services, if
the local baseline is not in the full access range.
4. Pays the TSO for its global imbalance.
5. Pays the DSO for the local imbalance, if a FSP for which the BRP
is responsible did not provide a flexibility service.
The local baseline, pba,n,t , which is positive for a production and
negative for a consumption, is provided on a day-ahead basis by
the BRP a for each MV bus n and each period t to the DSO. The
global baseline Pba,t is provided by the BRP to the TSO. For the sake
of clarity and conciseness, we consider that the BRP only has assets





The global imbalance of the BRP, Ia,t , is computed considering
the actual realization Pa,t , the total amount of flexibility activated
Ua,t and the flexibility provided Ha,t :
Ia,t = Pa,t − (Pba,t + Ua,t + Ha,t). (1)











where I+a,t and I−a,t are equal, respectively, to the positive and
negative part of the imbalance in period t, Ia,t .If the local baseline of the BRP, pba,n,t is within a flexibility
interval such that ka,n ≤ pba,n,t < la,n or La,n < pba,n,t ≤ Ka,n, the
BRP notifies the concerned FSPs that they must provide flexibility
services such that the realization pa,n,t can be included in the full
access range [la,n, La,n]. Note that in order to ensure that the FSP
can propose such a service, it probably has to optimize by itself the
whole baseline {pa,n,t |∀t ∈ T }.
The local information of the day-ahead baseline pba,n,t is used by
the DSO to operate its system. If requests to activate flexibility are
not satisfied, the BRP responsible for these FSPs is penalized at a




πn|(pba,n,t + ua,n,t + ha,n,t)− pa,n,t | (3)
where pa,n,t is the local realization, ua,n,t the local flexibility
activated in period t and ha,n,t the local flexibility provided.
2.2. Flexibility services provider and user
The main interactions that the FSP conducts are:
1. Obtains the flexibility needs of the FSUs, the baselines and the
obligations from the BRPs of the assets it controls.
2. Proposes flexibility services.
3. Activates flexibility upon the request of the FSUs.
Flexibility services need a reference in order to be quantified.
In this paper, we chose a baseline pa,n,t provided by the BRP. Note
that if the FSP is its own BRP, the agent with the combined roles
can optimize its baseline to maximize the flexibility it provides.
The other data at the FSP’s disposal is an indicator of the flexibility
needs in each bus and each period upward and downward. The
latter indicator is provided by the FSUs to help the FSP to quantify
the action it is able to perform.
A FSP offers a service i at a reservation priceπ ri and an activation
price π bi . We consider two types of flexibility services which are
represented in Fig. 3: a single period flexibility service, tailored,
for instance, for curtailment offers of wind generation units, which
defines amodulation range [mi,τi ,Mi,τi ] available for a given period
τi; and energy constrained flexibility service which defines for
each period t , a modulation range [mi,t ,Mi,t ]. A user of the latter
service may choose the modulation for each period under the
constraint that the average modulation is zero. This service is well
tailored for load modulation because the energy procured to the
load is preserved over the time horizonwith respect to the baseline
consumption.
In the last part, FSUs that have contracted some services provide
their activation requests to the FSPs. The total desired modulation
at bus n and period t is denoted by ha,n,t . The FSP controls its
assets to provide the desired modulation with respect to the
precomputed baseline.
A FSU has three main interactions with the system.
1. Computes and communicates an indicator of its upward and
downward flexibility needs in adjustable power for each bus
and each period.
2. Evaluates the flexibility offers from the FSP and selects the
services to contract.
3. Requests the activation of the contracted flexibility services.
How the needs are defined, the offers are evaluated and the
activation requested depends on the agent acting as FSU, cf.
Section 4. For instance, the DSO computes its flexibility needs to
overcome anticipated congestions.
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Fig. 3. Flexibility services implemented.(a) Base data. (b) Unrestricted access. Models 1 and 5.
(c) Restrictive access. Model 2. (d) Flexible acces. Models 3 and 4.
Fig. 4. Definition of the access bounds for each interaction model.3. Interaction models
The differences between interaction models originate from
the usage the stakeholders make of flexibility services, from
the remuneration and financial compensations associated with
the flexibility services, and from the terms of access contracts
delivered to the grid users. Access contracts define whether and to
which extent the DSO could require flexibility from its grid-users.
We consider that a FSP first makes a request to the DSO to get
access to a range [ga,n,Ga,n] : ga,n ≤ 0 ≤ Ga,n. Based on these
requested access bounds, the DSO computes safe access bounds
[ba,n, Ba,n] : ba,n ≤ 0 ≤ Ba,n. The safe access range ensures that
no congestion occurs if every grid user accesses the network in the
limits [ba,n, Ba,n]. These bounds are represented in Fig. 4. A more
comprehensive definition of this procedure is outside the scope of
this paper. Section 4.1 presents one simplemethod adopted for the
simulation.
Given the previous definitions, the five proposed interaction
models governing flexibility exchanges with the DSO are detailed
below. Stakeholders are free to exchange flexibility services among
them, but in Models 3–5, if the profile of a BRP is within the
flexibility intervals, it has to propose flexibility offers to the DSO
via FSPs.
Model 1. The DSO does not use any flexibility service and does not
restrict grid users: [la,n, La,n] = [ka,n, Ka,n] = [ga,n,Ga,n].
Model 2. The DSO does not use any flexibility service and allows
grid users to produce or consume only in the safe access bounds:
[la,n, La,n] = [ka,n, Ka,n] = [ba,n, Ba,n].
Model 3. The DSO sets [la,n, La,n] = [ba,n, Ba,n] for each agent but
allows access in the range [ka,n, Ka,n] = [ga,n,Ga,n]. The grid users
may be restrained to keep their production/consumption in the range
[la,n, La,n] upon request of the DSO. This restriction does not lead to
financial compensation by the DSO except for the imbalance created
by the request.
Model 4. This model is equivalent to Model 3 but the DSO pays for
the activation of the flexibility of the grid users. For instance, this case
allows producers to recover from the loss of the subsidies for green
energy generation.Model 5. The DSO does not oblige grid-users to provide flexibility,
i.e. [ka,n, Ka,n] = [la,n, La,n] = [ga,n,Ga,n]. The DSO can, however,
contract flexibility like any FSU.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed explanation
of the platform to reproduce the results, but it also enables the
definition of other interaction models and the completion of
additional analyses. New interaction models can be easily defined
using the following six parameters. More advanced modification
can be carried out by modifying the open-source code.
1. Is the DSO a FSU? Define if the DSO uses flexibility services. The
value is false for Models 1 and 2 and true for Models 3–5.
2. What is the cost at which the DSO buys flexibility? Different
options are implemented in this testbed. First, the DSO may
pay the same cost that a TSO or a BRP would pay. Another
alternative is that the DSO only pays for the imbalance caused
by the activation of the flexibility. A third option defines lower
costs for downward modulation services. These alternative
costs are used in Models 1–5. The activation cost of downward
modulation flexibility services is set to the energy price in the
corresponding period minus the marginal cost of the producer,
which is approximately the benefits of the producer. At the
stage of flexibility offers, the producer has already sold its
energy and since the distribution network does not have
enough capacity to carry the energy, the DSO must pay the
imbalance tariff by the activation of flexibility services. In this
setting, the benefits of the producer are attributed to the DSO
to reduce these imbalance costs.
3. What is the imbalance price paid by the DSO compared to BRPs?
In all interaction models described previously, the imbalance
tariff paid by the DSO is the same as any BRP. A preferential
tariff could be applied to the DSO since it can notify the TSO in
advance of the flexibility services activated and, therefore, the
resulting imbalance.
4. Does the DSO restrict the grid users? Three restriction patterns
are implemented: restrictive, flexible and unrestricted access.
These patterns are represented in Fig. 4.
5. What is the frequency of the access bound computation? Prior to
the day by day simulation of the system, the DSO computes
the access bounds [ba,n, Ban ] to its system. If every actor of
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further actions need to be taken by the DSO to ensure the
secure operation of its network. In a real system, this procedure
would not be performed in one round, since access contracts
are delivered with a certain delay after they were requested.
The aggregation of contracts of the low voltage contributors
should also be considered. A more realistic simulation would,
therefore, consider the legacy of access contracts. In the
framework of this simulation, two possibilities are available:
a computation based on the installed capacity and one based
on the maximum values observed by the grid user on the time
horizon of the simulation. The first option is more realistic but
the second might be considered in the future to increase the
freedom of the grid users. In Models 1–5, the option chosen is
the computation based on the installed capacity.
4. Agents
The agents simulated in this paper are the DSO, TSO, producers
and retailers. They may fulfill more than one role depending on
the interaction model. To operate its network, the DSO may act as
a FSU, as in Model 5 for instance. The TSO is, from the point of view
of this simulation, a FSU with given needs of flexibility services.
Producers and retailers both act simultaneously as BRPs, FSPs and
FSUs. The complete optimization problems solved by the agents
are provided in the Appendix. The global interactions between the
actors are summarized in Fig. 5. The courses of the events are
described from left to right going from short-term interactions to
settlement. Each type of actor is represented by a horizontal line.
Each vertical arrow represents an interaction between two types of
actors. The actor on the heads of the arrow receives the information
from the ones at the tails of the arrow indicated by the circles.
4.1. Distribution system operator
In our simulations, the DSO acts with the objective to reach
the technical optimum of the system. Prior to the day by day
simulation of the system, the DSO computes the access bounds
[ba,n, Ban ] to its system. If every actor of the system accesses to the
network within these bounds, no further actions need to be takenby the DSO to ensure the secure operation of its network. These
bounds are obtained by solving the optimization problem (5).
Next, the DSO acts as a FSU. Taking as input the baselines
provided by the BRPs and the characteristics of the network, the
DSO provides an indicator of its flexibility needs in MW for each
bus and each period in order to alleviate congestion in the lines.
These needs are obtained by solving problem (6).
For the flexibility procurement, the DSO solves problem (7).
Note that even though the DSO is not a BRP, it pays imbalance
fees caused by its usage of flexibility. This incentivizes the DSO to
activate, when it uses one flexibility service downward to alleviate
a congestion, to use another one upward to restore the balance.
The flexibility activation optimizationproblem is identical to (7)
except that it considers only the contracted flexibility services and
their activation costs. Note that as we use a deterministic simula-
tion, nothing changes between the reservation phase and the acti-
vation phase. As a result, the decisions taken in the activation phase
are identical to the ones foreseen in the reservation phase.
Finally, we opt for a simple real-time system control strategy
based on the realizations of the agents, which mimics a protection
scheme. If the flow in some lines is over their thermal capacity,
the DSO sheds production or consumption according to the
optimization problem (8).
4.2. Producer and retailer
Aproducer is a BRP, FSU and FSP. In order, a producer announces
its baselines, requests flexibility services, offers flexibility services,
buys and activates flexibility services, and finally regulates its
balance. A retailer is an actor which retails energy to its customers
and manages aggregated loads at the MV level. It fulfills the same
roles as the producer and, therefore, follows exactly the same
steps. For the sake of conciseness, we only detail the producer. The
specific optimization problems of the retailer (13), (14), (16) and
(17), are given in the Appendix.
The baselines of the producer are obtained by solving the
optimization problem (9). In this stage, the producer already
considers the possibility to be in imbalance considering the
expected imbalance price. The problem takes as parameters the
total upward and downward flexibility needs for each bus and
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Parameters of an interaction model.
Parameter Description
DSOIsFSU DSO is a FSU.
Value:True or False.
DSOFlexCost Sets the cost at which the DSO buys flexibility.
Value:imbalance, normal or full.
DSOImbalancePriceRatio Ratio of the imbalance price that is paid by the DSO with respect to the one paid by BRPs.
Value: Number, default value is 1.0.
accessRestriction Restricted access to the DSO network following the access agreement step of the DSO.
Value:none, conservative or flexible
accessBoundsComputation Access bounds computation type.
Value:horizon or installed.each period. These parameters could come from forecasts of the
producer or FSUs. The first approach is utilized in this paper, where
the forecast is based on the flexibility needs communicated by the
FSU in the previous days. Note that the real needs of the flexibility
users are communicated after the baselines are obtained according
to the interaction models.
Once the producer is notified of the acceptance of its offers on
the day-ahead energy market, it optimizes the flexibility it is able
to provide with respect to the announced baseline. This step is
modeled by the optimization problem (10). The producer procures
and activates flexibility services based on the solution of problem
(11).
Finally, the producer decides on the actual realizations for
each bus and each period by solving problem (12) considering
as a parameter the flexibility activation requests as a FSP and its
flexibility requests as a FSU. The producer minimizes its imbalance
in each period and also ensures that the realization in the bus in
which it should deliver a flexibility service is equal to the expected
value. The local imbalance is penalized at a regulated price.
4.3. Transmission system operator
The TSO is a pure FSU in this simulation. Its flexibility needs
are taken as data and are not localized. Any FSP may, in principle,
provide flexibility offers to the TSO. The flexibility contracted by
the TSO is computed by optimization problem (18). Since the TSO
can procure flexibility outside the distribution system, the surplus
of this stage is taken as the amount of flexibility collected in this
network weighted by a price representing the system benefits of
contracting reserve into the considered distribution network.
When the TSO decides to activate flexibility services, the
TSO solves an imbalance external to the considered distribution
system. Note that the imbalance coming from the considered
distribution system should not be solved by local flexibility
services to avoid counterbalancing DSO actions. The benefits of the
TSO coming from the activation of flexibility services in this part of
the network are computed by optimization problem (19).
4.4. Flexibility platform
The flexibility platform is an intermediary between FSUs and
FSPs. This platform could be operated either by a DSO, a TSO or
an independent party. One could implement interaction models
without a flexibility platform where FSUs and FSPs directly
exchange their services. The flexibility platform facilitates the
interaction and can anonymize the flexibility exchanges. Note that
a pure market based platform would probably not be a good
alternative due to the lack of liquidity as these services are highly
dependent on the location.
In our settings, the flexibility platform collects the flexibility
needs of the FSUs and communicates them to the FSPs. FSPs submit
their offers to the platform which sequentially proposes them to
the DSO, TSO and finally to other FSUs as depicted in Fig. 5. As theDSO solves local problems such as congestions, its needs can be
satisfied by fewer services than the imbalance problems faced by
the TSO or BRPs. This motivates the priority given to the DSO, but
other rankings could be investigated.
5. Implementation
The testbed is divided into three parts: the simulator, an
instance generator and a user interface. The first two are
implemented in Python 3. The user interface is composed of a client
in HTML5-Javascript and a server in Python 3 which facilitates the
use of the generator and the simulator, and provides an interface
to visualize the results.
5.1. Simulator
The simulator takes as input the parameters of all agents on
the simulated horizon, i.e. one day. A one year simulation can
be performed by simulating each day independently. All of the
parameters of the optimization problems given in the Appendix
should be provided by CSV files. A self detailed example is
given in the implementation. An additional CSV file contains the
parameters of the interaction model which are listed in Table 1.
The specific combination of the parameters of Table 1 to obtain the
models of Section 3 is encoded in the user interface of Section 5.3.
Based on all of the parameters, the simulator performs the
simulation of one time horizon, e.g. one day. The simulation
requires solving the optimization problems of the actors, which are
encoded in ZIMPL and solved using the SCIP solver [28]. To conduct
the simulation, some agents need predictions of some parameters
such as the flexibility needs of the FSU (see Section 4.2 for more
details). The simulation is initiated with these predictions set to
zero. If the realizations do not match the predictions after one
run, the simulation is reinitialized with the new realization. This
process is repeated until the realizations match the predictions or
after a predetermined number of iterations.
5.2. Instance generator
The instance generator allows a user to create an instance from
high-level parameters instead of having to specify manually the
assets of each agent. The reduced set of parameters is given in
Table 2 to which we add the interaction model parameters of
Table 1.
The instance generator takes as its basis, a network. The
networks already integrated are given in Fig. 6. The ratio of
installed production and consumption with respect to the one of
the whole network is given along with their topology. We now
detail the generation of the CSV parameter files for the simulator.
Generation of the producers. The producers are generated from
the data of a wind farm in 2013 scaled to the input mean and
maximum production in the network. Each bus with production
in the selected network is assigned randomly to one producer. The
84 S. Mathieu et al. / Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 5 (2016) 78–93Table 2
Parameters of the instance generator.
Parameter Type
Title of the instance String
Network Network name, see Fig. 6
Total production Mean and maximum value in MW
Production cost Price in e/MWh
Total consumption Mean and maximum value in MW
Retailing price Price in e/MWh
Energy price Mean and maximum value in e/MWh
Days of simulation Start and end day in {1, . . . , 365}
Interaction model parameters See Table 1
Number of periods by day Integer
Number of producers and retailers Integer
External imbalances of the producers and retailers Percentage of their total volume
Retailers flexibility reservation cost Price in e/MWh
TSO flexibility needs Volume in MW
TSO reservation price Price in e/MWh(a) Six buses example network. (b) 75 bus network from [29].
(c) Ylpic network.
Fig. 6. Networks available.maximum production for each period is set to the scaled baseline
value times the contribution of the bus with respect to the total
production in the network. The minimum production is the latter
valueminus the flexibility of the producer. The external imbalance
of the producer is generated uniformly between plus andminus its
mean production.
Generation of the retailers. The consumption curve is built from the
Belgian total load consumption of 2013 [30]. The share of each
retailer is randomly generated so that the shares sum up to one.
The mean baseline consumption of a retailer in one bus is the
total consumption curve times the retailer’s share and the ratio
of the consumption with respect to the one of the total network.
The sum in each period of the horizon of mean consumption
provides the total energy to consume Va,n. The minimum andmaximum realization bounds, pmina,n,t and p
max
a,n,t , are given by the
mean consumption plus and minus the consumption flexibility.
Generation of the price curves. The prices are generated by scaling
concurrently the Belpex day-ahead energy market prices [31] and
the Belgian imbalance tariffs of 2013 [30]. To ensure the coherence
of the input parameters of the simulator, the generator sets the
minimum imbalance tariff to the energy prices. If it was not done,
an agent could sell energy to the market without producing and
still get benefits from this controversial action.
Generation of the TSO. The flexibility needs of the TSO, R−t and
R+t , are constant values given as input parameters. The external
imbalance that the TSO faces in each period is randomly generated
following a uniform distribution between−R−t and R+t .
S. Mathieu et al. / Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 5 (2016) 78–93 85(a) Homepage with the parameters of the instance. (b) Global results for the simulated horizon.
(c) Daily results. Each bus and line can be clicked on to display its specific information.
Fig. 7. Screenshots of the user interface.Generation of the flexibility potential indicators. To operate its
system, the DSO needs an indication on where flexibility can be
obtained in its network. This information could, for instance, come
from access contracts or notification from the FSUs willing to
sell their services to the DSO. In this testbed, the knowledge of
potential availability of flexibility services is taken as a parameter
in optimization problem (6)which allows theDSO to communicate
its flexibility needs to the FSU based on the baselines of the BRPs.
The indicators of upward and downward flexibility availability for
each bus, respectively α+n and α−n ∈ [0,+∞[ are dimensionless
parameters. A 0 indicator indicates that no flexibility is available
while a large value indicates that a large amount of flexibility can
potentially be contracted in the bus with respect to the others.
In the instance generator, these indicators are arbitrarily
computed by the following procedure. First, the generator
computes the installed flexible production and consumption in
each bus in terms of power. We denote them respectively κ+ ∈
[0,+∞[MWand κ− ∈]−∞, 0]MW. Second, these data are used







where the numeric coefficient gives more importance to down-
ward flexibility by the production side.
5.3. User interface
The user interface simplifies the access to the instance
generator described in Section 5.2 and the simulator of Section 5.1.
Screenshots of the interface are given in Fig. 7. The home screen,
shown in Fig. 7(a), allows the creation of an instance via the
generator giving it parameters such as the interaction model or
the total production in the network. The global results screen, seenin Fig. 7(b), provides a summary of the simulation results of an
instance and graphs to see the evolution of the welfare or DSO
costs day by day. Daily results can be seen in the screen of Fig. 7(c).
The state of the network in each period is represented and specific
results to each bus and line can be obtained by clicking on it in the
network picture.
The webpage includes a Javascript client communicating with
a Python server which can either be on the same computer
or a different one. The server handles the requests of the user
and executes the instance generator or simulator. Note that the
server can handle multiple clients at the same time, queuing the
simulation requests, if needed. The simulations of multiple days
are performed efficiently by assigning the simulation of each day
to a different thread.
6. Results
The test case for the results is described in Section 6.1. A typical
one-day run is presented for one interaction model in Section 6.2.
Finally, the comparison of the five interactionmodels over one year
is presented in Section 6.3. The experiments are carried out on a
computer equipped with an Intel Core i7-3770 CPU at 3.40 GHz
with 32 GB of RAM. The optimization problems are solved with
SCIP [28].
6.1. Test case
The interaction models are tested on a generic 11 kV
distribution network composed of 75 buses and hosting 22
distributed generation units [29]. The network topology is fixed.
The simulation is run for a time horizon of one day divided into
24 periods. Production data of the 22 generation units are taken
from a production curve of 2013 scaled such that the maximum
production reaches 64.2 MW and the mean production is 16 MW.
Distributed generation units are clustered into three portfolios,
86 S. Mathieu et al. / Sustainable Energy, Grids and Networks 5 (2016) 78–93(a) A bus is colored in green if flexibility is used locally for at least one period of the simulation horizon. Similarly,
a bus is colored in red when shedding occurs, and a line is colored in blue when a thermal limit is reached.
(b) Total flexibility activated and imbalance for all agents in the system.
Fig. 8. Typical run on the test system. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)each managed by a different producer. The producers only ask for
a remuneration of the activation of their flexibility services. The
consumption of the 53 connected loads is built from the Belgian
total load consumption of 2013 scaled to a mean of 10.8 MW
and a maximum of 21 MW [30]. This consumption is divided into
three parts, each belonging to one retailer. The consumption of a
retailer is divided into a static part and a flexible part respectively,
accounting for 80% and 20% of the total consumption of the load.
The retailer proposes its flexibility with no activation fee but
requires a reservation fee. The reservation fee of a demand side
flexibility offer is assumed to be 5e/MWh. The TSO flexibility
aims to contract a volume of flexibility equal to 2% of the total
installed production capacity of the system in each period. We
use the following reservation prices of secondary reserve: π S
+
t =
−π S−t = 45e/MWh. The total activation request of the TSO is
drawn using a zero mean Gaussian distribution with a variance
equal to the target flexibility volume of the TSO. Energy prices are
taken from the clearing of 2013 of the Belpex day-ahead energy
market [31] scaled to a mean of 53.64e/MWh and a maximum
of 93.03e/MWh, excluding the extreme 2.5% of the original data.
The value of lost load taken into account in the case of shedding
due to the tripping of a protection is set to 500e/MWh for the
production and 1000e/MWh for the consumption. The imbalance
prices come from the Belgian TSO [30]. A FSP not providing acontracted flexibility service or violating its dynamic range is
penalized at 150% of the maximum imbalance price.
6.2. Typical run
We first provide illustrative results for Model 4 applied to the
test system based on the data of July 10, 2013. Fig. 8(a) illustrates
the events happening in the course of the simulation. Shedding
an MV bus disconnects only the devices connected to that bus,
and does not impact the surrounding MV buses of the system. The
maximum flow injected in the transmission network is 44.1 MW
at period 20. The DSO sheds a total of 12.6 of the 913.44 MWh of
generation potential, and activates 11.57 MWh of flexibility, on a
total of 17.8 MWh, which causes an equal imbalance volume. The
total imbalance, i.e. the sumof the imbalances over all agents in the
system, is 25.8 MWh. The total flexibility activated as well as the
imbalance of all agents in the system is given in Fig. 8(b). The total
welfare of the system is 32107e. The total DSO cost is 823e and
does not consider remuneration for the shed quantities. However,
the value of lost load and the value of lost production are taken
into account in the welfare value. The total benefit of all retailers
is 3340e. Benefits earned by the producers sum up to 29455e. The
TSO obtains a welfare of 1400e from the services acquired in the
system. A one day simulation lasts 312 s.
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All of the models are simulated under the same conditions for
365 days individually, which amounts to 32 h of simulation by
model. The main results are reported in Table 3.
Model 1 highlights that leaving the network with no control
leads to high shedding and impacts the welfare with a penalty of
about 12,000e by day. OnlyModel 2 yields no shedding but a lower
welfare due to the conservative actions of the DSO to restrict the
access of production units. This conservative strategy penalizes the
producers which are not allowed to produce in situations where
the network can handle higher injections. Using ANM strategies
as it is proposed in Models 3–5, leads to equivalent and higher
welfares even with average shedding penalties of 1000e per
day. These models would be more efficient if shedding could be
avoided. This necessity is caused by the activation of flexibility
services by the TSO in an opposite direction to the directives of the
DSO. The DSO activates flexibility services based on the baselines
so that once the services are activated, congestion no longer occurs.
However, the actual realization differs from the expectation since
the DSO as it is not the only user of use flexibility services. A better
coordination between the DSO and other FSUs would lead to even
higher welfare and is necessary to ensure the safety of the system
over the long term.
Only the TSO uses demand side flexibility in this simulation.
Even though flexibility services from the demand side are cheaper,
their usage is expensive for the DSO which must compensate the
imbalance created to solve a congestion problem. In addition, an
activation of an energy constrained flexibility offer in one period
requires another activation in a different period and, therefore, up
to a double imbalance compensation. A variant of these interaction
models could allow a discount for the DSO on the imbalance tariff.
Table 4 compares the surpluses of the producers in the last four
interactionmodelswith respect to the first one. These results show
that Model 2 significantly decreases the surplus of each producer.
The smallest producer is the most sensitive to the choice of the
interaction model but still the difference between Models 3–5
on its surplus is of the order of 1%. The two other producers are
less impacted by the ANM interaction models. This result may
motivate producers to bargain their flexibility for free, as long as
the imbalance is paid, in order to obtain an increased access to the
distribution network.
7. Conclusion
This paper proposes the open-source testbed DSIMA built to
analyze quantitatively interaction models for the exchange of
flexibility within distribution networks. The testbed simulates
the interactions of the DSO, the TSO, producers and retailers in
a medium-voltage distribution network. The simulation is per-
formed in an agent based framework where each agent maximizes
its individual objective. The testbed is composed of an instance
generator, a simulator and a web-based user interface written in
Python and HTML5/Javascript. These three modules allow various
compromises between flexibility and ease of modification.
This paper completely formalizes the interactions between
the stakeholders of a distribution system and all the interaction
models. Our analysis of the simulation results tends to show that
the active network management based interaction models lead
to the larger welfare. However, these models, in their current
version, cannot guarantee the operation of the network without
shedding due to the lack of coordination between the DSO and
the TSO. Restricting grid users to an access range computed
ahead of time to prevent any congestion is the only option out
of the proposed models to avoid shedding. The conservative
interaction model is shown to penalize some producers morethan others, raising the question of fairness of access range
allocation and flexibility activation. However, results show that
in the ANM models, producers may have an incentive to bargain
their flexibility for free, as long as the imbalance is paid, in order to
obtain an increased access to the distribution network. Introducing
a coordinationmechanism to ensure a globally coherent activation
of the flexibilitywould, therefore, lead to an interactionmodelwith
the largest welfare while avoiding shedding.
The work presented in this paper could be extended
along several lines. In the proposed interaction models, the BRP is
responsible of providing baselines for every medium-voltage bus.
However, several stakeholders may forecast these references: the
DSO, FSPs, BRPs, etc. and these choices should be further inves-
tigated by implementing them in this testbed. Additional imple-
mentation could add new interactionmodels or flexibility services.
One could also refine the modeling level, for instance, considering
alternating current power flow equations or alternative agent be-
haviors. The open-source code needed to continue thiswork can be
found at the address http://www.montefiore.ulg.ac.be/~dsima/.
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Appendix. Optimization problems of the agents
A.1. Nomenclature
In the following of the section the letters a, i, t and n index
agents, flexibility services, time periods, and buses, respectively.
Superscripts+ and− depict an upward or a downwardmodulation.
Parameters
αn Flexibility potential indicator
A Set of agents
Cn,m Capacity of the line (n,m)
ca,n,t Marginal cost of producer units
dn Flexibility potential indicator
Ea,t External imbalance to the system
[ba,n, Ba,n] Safe access bounds to the network
[ga,n,Ga,n] Requested access bounds to the network
N Total set of buses
Na Set of buses of agent a
N (n) Set of neighbors of bus n
[pmina,n,t , pmaxa,n,t ] Minimum and maximum realization
π Et Energy marginal price
π It Imbalance marginal price
π St Reservation price of secondary reserve
π l Penalty for a local imbalance
π ri Reservation price of a flexibility service




πVSP Value of shed production
πVSC Value of shed consumption
T Set of periods
Va,n Total energy needs over the horizon
Variables
[ba,n, Ba,n] Safe access bounds to the network
Ba Set of buses where the agent is responsible for its local
balance
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Comparison of the annual surpluses of the producers with respect to Model 1.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Producer 1 20,647e −34.97 −0.09 0.43 0.52 %
Producer 2 3,287e −44.70 3.06 4.26 3.66 %
Producer 3 13,809e −36.56 −0.01 0.38 0.37 %En Set of energy constrained flexibility offers
∆a,n,t Total flexibility offered by the FSP
ha,n,t Total requested modulation to the FSP
Ia,t Imbalance of an agent
It Total imbalance of the system
fn1,n2,t Active power flow in line (n1, n2)[ka,n, Ka,n] Flexible access range of a FSP
[la,n, La,n] Full access range of a FSP
[mi,t ,Mi,t ] Modulation range of the flexibility service
pba,n,t Day-ahead baseline of an agent
Pbn,t Aggregated day-ahead baseline of the agents
pa,n,t Realization of an agent
Pn,t Aggregated realization of the agents
ra,n,t Flexibility needs indicator
Sn Set of single period flexibility offers
Rt Flexibility activation needs of the TSO
St Flexibility contracted by the TSO
ua,n,t Total requested modulation by the FSU
va,i Modulation of flexibility service i ∈ Sn
[wa,i,Wa,i] Requested modulation range of flexibility service i ∈
En
xa,i,t Modulation of the flexibility service i ∈ En
ya,i Binary variable for the reservation of flexibility service
i ∈ En
zn,t Binary variable equal to 1, if the bus is shed
A.2. Optimization problems of the distribution system operator
Access agreement. Optimization problem solved to obtain the safe
access interval [ba,n, Ba,n] from the access request [ga,n,Ga,n].
The objective minimizes the maximum relative access restriction
downward and upward, δg and δG, subject to the operational limits
of the system, here the line capacities only. Worst case conditions
are considered through the auxiliary variables f
n,m
and f n,m. The
first case corresponds to no production and the consumption at
its maximal allowed value for each agent and each bus, ba,n. The
second is equivalent to a case where there is no consumption and
all production is at its maximum bound Ba,n.
min δg + δG (5a)
subject to, ∀n,m ∈ N 2,














∀n ∈ N , a ∈ A(n)
δg ≥(ga,n − ba,n)/ga,n (5e)
δG ≥(Ga,n − Ba,n)/Ga,n (5f)
ga,n ≤ba,n ≤ 0 ≤ Ba,n ≤ Ga,n. (5g)Announcement of the flexibility needs. The flexibility needs of the
DSO in MW, r+DSO,n,t and r
−











− Cn,m ≤ fn,m,t ≤ Cn,m ∀n,m ∈ N 2 (6b)
a∈A
pba,n,t + r+DSO,n,t − r−DSO,n,t =

m∈N (n)
fn,m,t ∀n ∈ N (6c)
r+DSO,n,t , r
−
DSO,n,t ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ N . (6d)
The positive parameters α+n and α−n characterize the flexibility
potential at each bus and are obtained from the DSO knowledge of
the system. In the implementation, these parameters are provided
by the instance generator.
Flexibility procurement and activation. The DSO can procure a subset
of the proposed single period flexibility offers, Sn, and energy
constrained flexibility offers En. Let va,i be the variable for the
modulation of the single period flexibility service i and [wa,i,Wa,i]
the requested reservation range. Let x+a,i,t , x
−
a,i,t ≥ 0 be the variables
for the upward and downward activation of the energy constrained
flexibility service i ∈ E . Note that an energy constraint bid cannot








































pba,n,t + uDSO,n,t =

m∈N (n)








x+DSO,i,t − x−DSO,i,t ∀n ∈ N , t ∈ T
(7d)
mi ≤ wDSO,i ≤ vDSO,i ≤ WDSO,i ≤ Mi ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ Sn
(7e)
mi,tyDSO,i ≤ x+DSO,i,t − x−DSO,i,t ≤ Mi,tyDSO,i ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ En, t ∈ T
(7f)
t∈T
(x+DSO,i,t − x−DSO,i,t) = 0 ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ En
(7g)
I+DSO,t − I−DSO,t =

n∈NDSO
uDSO,n,t ∀t ∈ T
(7h)
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−
DSO,t ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T .
(7i)
The DSO minimizes the cost of flexibility procurement, the
estimated cost of shedding production or consumption encoded by
the variable zn,t and the imbalance cost caused by the activation of
flexibility services. The result of the activation of flexibility services
is computed in the variable uDSO,n,t by (7d). Constraint (7g) ensures
that the energy constrained bids are used neutrally in energy.
Note that the problem should always be feasible since the DSO
could shed every bus of the network i.e. all the production and
consumption attached to the bus. This shedding is penalized at a
virtual cost πVLP for the production and πVLC for the consumption.
Real-time operation. A simple protection scheme is represented
by the following optimization problem where the only decision



















fn,m,t ∀n ∈ N . (8c)
A.3. Optimization problems of the producer
Optimization of the baselines.With the following optimization prob-
lem, the producer obtains a baseline for each of its assets consid-
ering the following decision stages. We consider that the producer
has only one asset by bus. Note that this is not the restrictive as-
sumption since a bus with two assets can be represented as two
buses with one asset linked by a line of infinite capacity.
The flexibility needs of the FSUs cannot be expressed as
constraints, since the producer may not be willing nor be able
to satisfy them, a simple way to translate these needs in the
optimization model of the FSP is to define fictive prices which















, where πRn is a reference flexibility
price. This price is a scale factor to quantify the importance of
the expected revenue from flexibility with respect to the cost of
energy. The flexibility that could be offered upward and downward







































ka,n ≤ pba,n,t , pa,n,t , p+a,n,t , p−a,n,t ≤ Kn,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (9b)






pba,n,t ∀t ∈ T (9c)
∆+a,n,t ≤ p+a,n,t − pba,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (9d)
∆−a,n,t ≤ pba,n,t − p−a,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (9e)
pmina,n,t ≤ pba,n,t , pa,n,t , p+a,n,t , p−a,n,t ≤ pmaxa,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (9f)
p−a,n,t ≤ La,n ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (9g)
la,n ≤ p+a,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (9h)
I+a,t , I
−
a,t ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T . (9i)Optimization of the flexibility offers. The baseline of the producer,
pba,n,t is now fixed. The flexibility available from the producer
portfolio is computed using the following optimization problem.
If all the baselines of the producer are unchanged with respect to
the one computed in the baseline optimization step, the flexibility




































pmina,n,t ≤ pa,n,t , p+a,n,t , p−a,n,t ≤ pmaxa,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (10b)






pba,n,t ∀t ∈ T (10c)
∆+a,n,t ≤ p+a,n,t − pba,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (10d)
∆−a,n,t ≤ pba,n,t − p−a,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (10e)
ka,n ≤ pa,n,t , p+a,n,t , p−a,n,t ≤ Kn,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (10f)
p−a,n,t ≤ La,n ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (10g)
la,n ≤ p+a,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T . (10h)
For each period t and each bus n, the producer makes one single
period flexibility offer upward of∆+a,n,t at an activation price ca,n,t
and one downward of ∆−a,n,t at an activation price π Et − ca,n,t . The
reservation price is a parameter of the simulated instance.
Flexibility services procurement and activation. The producer
flexibility procurement optimization problem is similar to the one


































pmina,n,t ≤ pa,n,t ≤ pmaxa,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (11b)







x+a,i,t − x−a,i,t ∀n ∈ N , t ∈ T (11d)
mi ≤ wa,i ≤ va,i ≤ Wa,i ≤ Mi ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ Sn (11e)
mi,tya,i ≤ x+a,i,t − x−a,i,t ≤ Mi,tya,i ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ En, t ∈ T (11f)
t∈T
(x+a,i,t − x−a,i,t) = 0 ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ En (11g)






(pba,n,t + ua,n,t) ∀t ∈ T (11h)
I+a,t , I
−
a,t ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T . (11i)
Optimization of the realization. The producer chooses the realization
considering as a parameter the flexibility activation requests ha,n,t
as a FSP and its flexibility requests as a FSU ua,n,t . Note the local


























(i+a,n,t + i−a,n,t) (12a)
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pmina,n,t ≤ pa,n,t ≤ pmaxa,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T
(12b)
ka,n ≤ pa,n,t ≤ Kn,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T
(12c)










a,t ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
(12e)




a,n,t ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T , n ∈ Na.
(12g)
A.4. Optimization problems of the retailer
Optimization of the baselines. The retailer baseline optimization








































pmina,n,t ≤ pba,n,t , pa,n,t , p+a,n,t , p−a,n,t ≤ pmaxa,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (13b)
t∈T
pa,n,t = Va,n ∀n ∈ Na (13c)






pba,n,t ∀t ∈ T (13d)
∆+a,n,t ≤ p+a,n,t − pba,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (13e)
∆−a,n,t ≤ pba,n,t − p−a,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (13f)
ka,n ≤ pba,n,t , pa,n,t , p+a,n,t , p−a,n,t ≤ Kn,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (13g)
p−a,n,t ≤ La,n ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (13h)
la,n ≤ p+a,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (13i)
I+a,t , I
−
a,t ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T . (13j)
Optimization of the flexibility offers. The baseline of the retailer,
pba,n,t is now fixed. The flexibility available from the producer
portfolio is computed using the following optimization problem.
If all the baselines of the retailer are unchanged with respect to
the one computed in the baseline optimization step, the flexibility




































ka,n ≤ pa,n,t , p+a,n,t , p−a,n,t ≤ Kn,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (14b)
t∈T






pba,n,t ∀t ∈ T (14d)
∆+a,n,t ≤ p+a,n,t − pba,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (14e)
∆−a,n,t ≤ pba,n,t − p−a,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (14f)
pmina,n,t ≤ pa,n,t , p+a,n,t , p−a,n,t ≤ pmaxa,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (14g)
p−a,n,t ≤ La,n ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (14h)
la,n ≤ p+a,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (14i)
I+a,t , I
−
a,t ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T . (14j)
For each busn, the retailermakes one energy constrained flexibility
offer for the whole time horizon where the maximum and
minimum modulation amplitudes are given by ∆+a,n,t and ∆−a,n,t .
No activation fee is required by the retailer for its service. The











a,n,nt − p0a,n,t) (15)
where the second part is the cost of using the baseline pba,n,t to
increase the available flexibility with respect to a baseline p0a,n,t
which is obtained by solving problem (13) without considering
flexibility (by setting π∆
+
n,t = π∆−n,t = 0).
Flexibility services procurement and activation. The retailer flexibil-
ity procurement optimization problem is similar to the one of the


































pmina,n,t ≤ pa,n,t ≤ pmaxa,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T (16b)
t∈T
pa,n,t = Va,n ∀n ∈ Na (16c)







x+a,i,t − x−a,i,t ∀n ∈ N , t ∈ T (16e)
mi ≤ wa,i ≤ va,i ≤ Wa,i ≤ Mi ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ Sn (16f)
mi,tya,i ≤ x+a,i,t − x−a,i,t ≤ Mi,tya,i ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ En, t ∈ T (16g)
t∈T
(x+a,i,t − x−a,i,t) = 0 ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ En (16h)






(pba,n,t + ua,n,t) ∀t ∈ T (16i)
I+a,t , I
−
a,t ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T . (16j)
Optimization of the realization. The retailer chooses the realization
considering as parameter flexibility activation requests ha,n,t as
a FSP and its flexibility requests as a FSU ua,n,t . Note the local


























(i+a,n,t + i−a,n,t) (17a)
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pmina,n,t ≤ pa,n,t ≤ pmaxa,n,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T
(17b)
t∈T
pa,n,t = Va,n ∀n ∈ Na
(17c)
ka,n ≤ pa,n,t ≤ Kn,t ∀n ∈ Na, t ∈ T
(17d)










a,t ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
(17f)




a,n,t ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T , n ∈ Na.
(17h)
A.5. Optimization problems of the transmission system operator
Flexibility procurement. The TSO is a pure FSU in which flexibility
needs R+t and R−t are taken as data and are not localized. Any FSP
may, in principle, offer up to these amounts to the TSO. The flexibil-
ity contracted by the TSO, S+t and S−t , is obtained by solving (18). As
the TSO can procure flexibility outside of the distribution system,
the amount of flexibility collected in this network weighted by the







t min{S+t , R+t } + π S
−






































mi,tyTSO,i ∀t ∈ T
(18c)
mi ≤ wTSO,i ≤ vTSO,i ≤ WTSO,i ≤ Mi ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ Sn
(18d)
mi,tyTSO,i ≤ x+TSO,i,t − x−TSO,i,t ≤ Mi,tyTSO,i ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ En, t ∈ T
(18e)
t∈T
(x+TSO,i,t − x−TSO,i,t) = 0 ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ En.
(18f)
Flexibility activation. When the TSO decides to activate flexibility
























TSO,i,t + x−TSO,i,t) (19a)subject to
ETSO,t + I+t − I−t +

n∈N












TSO,t ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ T
(19d)
wTSO,i ≤ vTSO,i ≤ WTSO,i ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ Sn
(19e)
mi,tyTSO,i ≤ x+TSO,i,t − x−TSO,i,t ≤ Mi,tyTSO,i ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ En, t ∈ T
(19f)
t∈T
(x+TSO,i,t − x−TSO,i,t) = 0 ∀n ∈ N , i ∈ En.
(19g)
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